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POST-MORTEM SPERM PROCUREMENT:
IS IT LEGAL?
Susan Kerr*
Florida: A violent car accident leaves a newlywed widow but not
able to conceive the child of her dead husband.'
New York: A vacation turns tragic when an altercation with police
ends a man's life.2 But his death does not end his wife's dreams of
having his children.3
Chicago: A woman offers not only condolences upon the death of
her friend's husband, but the suggestion that she have his sperm
'B.A. Barnard College, Columbia University; J.D. University of Houston Law Center,
M.P.H., University of Texas Health Science Center, Ph.D. candidate in Managemnt and Policy
Sciences University of Texas Health Science Center.
'William Lowther, I Want a Baby by My Dead Husband; Ethics Row ftr Sp-rm is Tal:cn
from Crash Victim, ASSOCIATED NEWSPAPERS LTD., June 19, 1994, at 13; Ro. land StIteler,
Liquid Assets; Dwight Brunoehler Is an Altogether Dijferent Kind of Banl.er, "h Offrs Lyf7
Itself as a Return on Investment. For the Wife and Mother of Manny Maresca, That lMas the
Bottom Line, ORLANDO SENTENEL, Sept. 11 1994, at 8; see also, Kathleen Murray, Poumlnimqaus
Conception an Ethical Trap, STARTRIB., Aug. 11995 (providing updated inforiation on Pamela
Maresca's decision).
'Carole Agus, Drop of Life; Docs Rush to Save Sperm of Man Killcd in Cop Stnigle
NEWSDAY, Jan. 19, 1995, at A3; Carole Agus, Sperm Taken from Corpse in N Y First, Tu\oT0
STAR, Jan. 20, 1995, at A14; Widow Hopes to Have Child Using Dead Husband's Spcrm, CHI.
TRiB., Jan. 20, 1995, at 4.
'Carole Agus, Drop of Life; Does Rush to Save Sperm of Man Ktllcd in Cop Snigl,
NEWSDAY, Jan. 19, 1995, at A3; Carole Agus, Sperm Taken from Corpse in N Y First, T02OO\TO
STAR, Jan. 20, 1995, at A14; Widow Hopes to Have Child Using Dead Husband's Sperm, CHI.
TRm., Jan. 20, 1995, at 4.
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retrieved and frozen so that in the future she could have his
children.4
London: Like most wives, she wants to have her husband's baby
because she loves him and wants to have a baby that is the
embodiment of that love and spirit.5 The problem, or maybe not, is
he died of meningitis before conception.6
Los Angeles: A doctor in Los Angeles gives these women and
others hope.' He has confirmed that one ofhis patients is pregnant
with the child of her dead husband using sperm retrieved after his
death.8
These scenarios represent the media debut of a procedure, post-mortem
sperm procurement, in which viable sperm are obtained from cadavers.
9
This procedure is thought to be so uncommon that it has made headlines
when it has occurred. However, the first report of post-mortem sperm
procurement appeared in the medical literature in 1980 when Dr. Cappy
Rothman published a method for obtaining viable sperm from a deceased
male.'0 The procedure was used on a thirty-year-old man who had died
in a motorcycle accident and whose family sought to preserve his sperm.II
In his article, Dr. Rothman details the removal of the vas deferens, which
is then flushed with Tyrode's solution.12 The resulting solution is then
4Louise Kieman, Widow Has Sperm of Her Husband Saved, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 24, 1995, at
I.
'Widow May Get OK to Use Her Husband's Frozen Sperm, HOUS. CHRON., Feb. 7, 1997.
Ms. Blood was granted possession of the sperm but because of the mandates set forth by England's
Human Fertilization (sic) and Embryology Authority, she was not able to use it for in vitro
fertilization without her husband's written consent. Ms. Blood is looking into traveling to another
European country with less strict laws to have the procedure performed. The Oprah Witnfrev Show
(Syndicated television broadcast, Apr. 16, 1998).6Widow May Get OK to Use Her Husband's Frozen Sperm, HOUS. CHiRON., Feb. 7, 1997.
'Doctor Says Sperm Taken from Man Just After Death Leads to Pregnancy Boston Globe
Online (last modified July 16, 1998)< http://vww.boston.com/dailynews/wire.html/>; CBS This
Morning, (CBS television broadcast, July 20, 1998) (Interview with Dr. Cappy Rothman who
performed the retrieval, in vitro fertilization and implantation).
81d.
9See Cappy M. Rothman, A Method for Obtaining Viable Sperm in the Postnortmn State,
34 FERTILITY & STERILITY 512 (1980).
'
0See id.
"See id.
12See id.
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centrifuged to obtain the viable semen.13  The semen can then be
cryopreserved for future use.'4  Since 1980, other methods for post-
mortem sperm retrieval have evolved. These include epididymal
extraction," epididymal aspiration, vas deferens irrigation" and
electroejaculation.17
3See id.
14See Rothman, supra note 9, at 512.
'
5Epididymal extraction is performed as follows:
After a declaration of death, an incision is made over the prostatic fascia to
expose the pelvic vas, ampulla and seminal vesicle. Place the eciEed
segments in Tyrode's solution. Perform a bilateral vasoseminal
vesiculectomy to expose the testis through an intravaginal sEcrotal incision.
Excise the epididymis from the efferent ductules to the convoluted tubules
and place in Tyrode's solution. After obtaining the excurrent duct system,
excise the seminal vesicle from the vas and the ampulla. Flush the vas
segment with 3 ml of Tyrode's solution. Motile sperm should be observable
microscopically. If mobile, mix these sperm with glycerol and place in 1 ml
vials for cryopreservation.
Next, remove the epididymal fascia exposing the tubules. Resect the
epididymal head from the body and tail, and mince with microscissors, Treat
motile sperm with glycerol and place in I ml vials for cryopreservation in
liquid nitrogen at -1960i C.
Rothman, supra note 9, at 512.
'"Vas deferens irrigation is performed as follows:
After a declaration of death, sterilize the scrotum area. Manipulate right or
left vas deferens under the median raphe and grasp with a ring clamp. Using
a no-scalpel dissecting clamp, dissect the vas free of surrounding tisue
Mobilize the vas out of the scrotal entry site. Using a 15i ultrasharp knife
make a hemivasotomy. Insert a 22 gauge angiocatheter into the vasal lumen
toward the epididymis. Irrigate the vas with 0.1 cc volumes of human tubal
fluid medium. To prevent leakage out of the vasal lumen during irrgation,
manually compress the vas around the angiocatheter, Also manipulate the
epididymous to facilitate retrieval of fluid. Dilute the obtained fluid in a total
volume of 3.9 cc of human tubal fluid. Return the vas to the scrotum,
Procedure takes approximately 10 minutes.
Peter N. Schlegel, Post-nortem Sperm Retrival: Technique and Erclusionar3y Criteria IFeb, 6,
1995) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Department of Urology, The New York Hospital-
Comell Medical Center, 525 East 681 St., New York, NY 10021).
'TElectroejaculation is performed as follows:
Urinary pH should be neutralized and bowel movement induced to obtain optimal
contact of the rectal electrode. Initially, complete cathetenzation of the bladder
is performed and an insemination medium is instilled into the bladder as buffer
With patient lying in the decubitus position, the electrical rectal probe is inserted
1999]
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While techniques for procurement and storage of sperm have been
available for more than a decade, it was not until June 1994 that the
general public's attention was drawn to this unique procedure.
Newlyweds Manny and Pamela Maresca made national news when
Pamela stated she wanted to preserve the sperm of her deceased husband
so that she could bear his child. 8 Within hours of his death, Manny's
sperm was retrieved and preserved for Pamela's future use.'9
Subsequently, reports indicated that Pamela had discontinued birth control
injections in preparation for becoming pregnant.2"
Fifteen months later Pamela changed her mind.2' She decided she did
not wish to use her late husband's sperm to conceive.22 Instead, her
mother-in-law wants to use it!23  Forty-two year old Leslie Maresca,
mother of six, wants to give birth to her own grandchild presumably using
a donor egg.24 Pamela states she is willing to consent to this use of the
frozen sperm.25 Because the physician retrieved enough viable sperm for
into the rectum, with electrodes facing anteriorly. Stimulation is carried out in a
sine wave summation pattern with progressively increasing voltage delivery.
Throughout the procedure the current, voltage, and temperature of the probe are
monitored.
An assistant milks the bulbous urethra to direct semen into a container,
since emission is not coupled with any forceful projectile ejaculation. When it
appears that the patient has no more fluid coming out of the urethra, stimulation
is terminated. The bladder is then catheterized and the retrograde ejaculate, if
present, is removed. The bladder is rinsed with buffered insemination medium to
suspend any remaining sperm for extraction. Both antegrade and retrograde
specimens are processed for use.
Pak H. Chung et al., Assisted Fertility Using Electroejaculation in Men
with Spinal Cord Injury-A Review of Literature, 64 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1
(1995); see also Dana A. Ohl, Electroejaculation, 20 UROLOGY CLINICS OF
NORTH AMERICA 181 (1993). Regardless of the procedure used, it is generally
accepted that retrieval must be attempted within 24 hours of death to have any
chance of retrieving viable semen. However, it is important to note that in the
case ofthe only reported pregnancy, the sperm is said to have been retrieved some
30 hours post mortem. Seesupra note 5; see also G. J. Matthews & M. Goldstein,
A Simplified Method of Epididymal Sperm Extraction, 47 UROLOGY 123-25
(1996).
18See supra note 1.
"
9See supra id.
2 See supra id.
2 See Interview with Ruth Streeter, producer of 60 Minutes, in Philadelphia, Pa. (Sept. 9,
1995).
22See id.
2'See id.24See id.
2'See id.
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two insemination attempts, physicians are optimistic that using recently
developed microinjection techniques such as intracytoplasmic sperm
injection (ICSI), conception can be achieved.26 The impediment in this
scenario is that the sperm bank which holds Manny's frozen deposit wants
Pamela to obtain a court order permitting it to legally release the deposit
to Manny's mother.27 This is only one of many stories involving post-
mortem sperm procurement in which the medicine is much simpler than
the legal and ethical questions involved.
Post-mortem sperm procurement is only one point on the expanding
continuum of assisted reproductive technologies that perhaps began with
the first reported case of human artificial insemination in 1770 and
apparently has no end in sight.28  Like other assisted reproductive
technologies, the ability to procure sperm from deceased men, store it, and
use it at a later date raises serious legal and ethical questions. Some such
questions involve, what are the "rights" of the deceased? Should dead
men be fathering children? Should a dead man become a father without
his explicit consent? If consent is crucial, then who can give it if the
deceased has not done so? What is in the best interest of a future child?
Still other questions involve the "rights" of others to both procure and
control sperm and its use after death, such as, who has a right to a
deceased man's sperm? Should there be restrictions on who can use the
sperm to try to conceive a child? Can those who would have no legal
standing in a court of law ever request and utilize a cadaver's sperm, for
instance long-standing heterosexual or homosexual partners? Should
26See Lowther, supra note 1, at 13.
27See Streeter, supra note 21.
2'See STEVEN KING, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR AND THE LAW 59-60 (1965); sce gcncralki J.
Robertson, CHnIDRENOFCHOICE, (1994); E. Donald Shapiro &BenedeneSonneblick, The W'do'
and the Sperm: The Law ofPost-Mortem Insemination, 1 L. & HEtLTH 229, 234 (19S7) (Prior
to its use with humans, breeders used frozen bull semen to inseminate their cattle. It has been
speculated that the first successful artificial insemination (Al) occurred in the 14th century v,. hen
an Arab mare was inseminated with stallion semen. The first reported case ofAI in human bh-in2s
was in England in 1770. It was almost a century later, in 1866, that physician Marion Simm3
successfully inseminated a woman. Although sperm was being frozen as early as 12 66, it3 use for
artificial insemination was not consistently successful until 1949, %%.hen it was discovered that
sperm frozen with the addition of glycerol had a better survival rate. Conception outside the
human body was first achieved in 1969, and the first live birth resulting from such in utro
fertilization occurred in 1978. The first live birth resulting from previously frozen ova occurred
in 1986, however success rates are very low because science has not perfected a method to
unfreeze the fragile ova without damage. Pre-embryos seem heartier then ova and have been
successfully frozen, thawed and implanted since the mid 1980's).
1999]
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parents or family members be permitted to condition organ donation on
post-mortem sperm retrieval? Can sperm retrieval be equated to organ
donation? What if the deceased is a minor and the procurement is for
lineage purposes? Finally, should retrieved sperm be made available for
any purpose other than the conception of a child?
Many of these questions will require sustained societal examination
and debate as well as legal intervention. However, before serious debate
can begin to resolve any of these issues, two steps of the process of post-
mortem sperm procurement must be addressed. First, it is necessary to
determine the prevalence of post-mortem sperm procurement. Is it being
requested and performed? If so, how frequently? And second, if it is
being requested and performed, is it legal? Once these questions are
clarified, the parameters of the debate will be defined, and productive
oration to resolve the legal, medical and ethical questions associated with
post-mortem sperm procurement can ensue.
Post-mortem sperm procurement is an illustrative example of the
need for law to be prospective rather than retrospective in the field of
reproductive technology: a field that impacts the people of today and the
children of tomorrow. Thus, this discussion will focus on the legal issues
associated with the isolated practice of retrieving sperm from dead men to
create a new life. The first section will detail the prevalence of the
requests for post-mortem sperm procurement and the reported performed
procedures. The next section will discuss the law relating to dead bodies.
Post-mortem sperm procurement involves a minimally invasive medical
procedure on a dead body, as opposed to a live individual choosing to
cryobank his sperm which is then used posthumously to produce offspring.
Therefore, it is significantly different from other reported means of
posthumous reproduction which may require the prior consent of the
deceased. Thus, at the essence of the issue is, what rights, if any, does a
dead person have? What legally can and cannot be done to a dead body?
The following section will address procreative liberty: the right to and the
right not to procreate. Does the right to procreate extend to non-coital
reproduction? Does it extend to the dead? Does it extend to procreating
with the dead? The final section will conclude that by application,
analogy and extrapolation, it is legal to procure sperm from a dead man
and use it for reproductive purposes. The question remains, however,
whether simply because something is legal, implies that it should be
performed. Presently this question is one of personal choice. The ethical,
moral and religious factors that influence such a decision are beyond the
[Vol. 3:39
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scope of this discussion, but one suggestion will be made: an amendment
to the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act to include procurement of tissue for
reproductive purposes. This would provide credence and clarity regarding
post-mortem sperm procurement, which is one step in helping people
make informed decisions in the arena of procreative liberty. It might also
help to limit any potential litigation arising out of this controversial
procedure.
THE STATUS OF POST-MORTEM
SPERM PROCUREMENT
Post-mortem sperm procurement is being requested and performed
throughout the United States at numbers greater than any newspaper or
television medical drama could have speculated.' 9 It is also probable that
it is being requested and performed at numbers even greater than
reported. 30 The concept of post-mortem sperm procurement is no longer
an intellectual exercise for lawyers, physicians and bioethicists.
From 1980 through July 1995, forty fertility centers out of the 254
surveyed reported receiving a total ofeighty-two requests forpost-mortem
sperm procurement.31 More than half of these reported requests were
made in the last year, indicating a rising trend and signaling a potential
problem. 32 Furthermore, fifteen of these facilities reported honoring a total
of twenty-five requests.33 These requests and procedures are being made
to and performed by facilities throughout the country. "
While these numbers may seem small, they are believed to be
conservative estimates.3 - Because the population surveyed in the cited
study targeted facilities specializing in in vitro fertilization and other
reproductive technologies, they often reported being unequipped to
perform post-mortem sperm procurement.36 Specifically, eight facilities
stated they would or did refer a request for post-mortem sperm
'See supra notes 1, 2 and 3; see also Chicago Hope (CBS television broadeazt, Sept. 25,
1995).
"
0See S.M. Kerr, Post-Mortem Sperm Procurement, 157 J. UROLO GY 2154-58, (1997).
"See id.
'2See id.
"See id.
'See id.
"See Kerr, supra note 30, at 2154-5S.
'
6See id.
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procurement to a urologist.37 Furthermore, given that the requests are
primarily being made by women who are associated with men who died
of a trauma, it is likely that a urologist in a hospital setting would be a
more logical and accessible choice to present one's request for post-
mortem sperm procurement than an assisted reproductive facility."
Of the twenty-five procedures performed, all semen retrievals were
reported as presently cryopreserved with the exception of one sample.
39
This sample was retrieved from a fifteen year old boy at the request of his
parents, who some years later withdrew the sperm from storage.4" The
cryobank that held the deposit had no knowledge of its final disposition.4 1
There is no question that post-mortem sperm procurement has been
and continues to be requested and performed at an increasing rate. With
conservative estimates such as these, reproductive technologies being
honed, and media attention mounting, this scenario begs the question: is
it legal to take sperm from a dead man?
THE RELEVANT LAW RELATING
TO DEAD BODIES
Status of the Deceased
"The earth belongs in usufruct to the living; the dead have neither powers
nor rights over it."42 This sentiment was echoed again, almost two
centuries later in Whitehurst v. Wright43 when the court stated, "[a]fter
death, one is no longer a person within our constitutional and statutory
framework, and has no rights of which he may be deprived.' '4
In Whitehurst, a man was gunned down by the Montgomery,
Alabama police who mistook him for a local robbery suspeet41
Authorities claimed that the fatal shot by police was in response to a shot
fired at the officer by Whitehurst 6 Initially, none of the officers in the
37See id.
3 See id.39See id.40See Kerr, supra note 30, at 2154-58.
4'See id.
42THOMAS JEFFERSON, 7 JEFFERSoN'S WoRKs 454 (Monticello ed. 1904) (Letter to James
Madison dated Sept. 6, 1789).
43Whitehurst v. Wright, 592 F.2d 834 (5th Cir. 1979).
44Id. at 834.
45See id.
46See id.
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vicinity found a gun near the body.47 However, a detective later called to
the scene found a gun twenty-seven inches from Whitehurst's body.4 1 It
was subsequently revealed that the gun was confiscated by the police in
a drug raid one year prior to the shooting.4
In reaction to these suspect events, Ida Mae Whitehurst, mother of the
deceased, brought suit under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 and 1986, claiming
that the shooting and alleged cover-up accomplished under color of state
law deprived her son of rights guaranteed by the fifth, sixth, thirteenth and
fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution."0 The district
court found that her claim under section 1983 for the alleged cover-up did
not exist because if it took place at all, it was subsequent to Whitehurst's
death and consequently could not have deprived him of any rights."' The
court also determined that no claim was stated under section 1985 because
any conspiracy to violate Whitehurst's civil rights ended with his death
and could not be retroactively established."2 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's opinion. The
appellate court could find no case that recognized or refused to recognize
the civil rights of a corpse,53 and therefore, the court derived its decision
from the rationale in Roe v. Wade.
54
In Roe, the Supreme Court held that a fetus was not a person under
the Fourteenth Amendment and has no rights thereunder."5 Although the
court acknowledged that the fetus had the potential for sustaining life in
the future, this was not sufficient to find that the fetus was a person for
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.5' Extrapolating from this
decision, the court in Wzitehurst held that if being capable of sustaining
life in the future was not sufficient for bestowing constitutional rights,
then surely a corpse, having no potential for life, was not a person under
the umbrella of the Constitution. 
5 7
47See id.
4 See Whitehurst, 592 F.2d at 834.
49See id.
"'See id. at 835.
"
1See id.
2See id.
53From the date of the decision in Whitehurst to the time of this witing, the author could
find no reported case that recognizes the civil rights of a corpse.
54Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
'
5See id.
56See id.
'See Whitehurst v. Wright, 592 F.2d 834, 834 (5th Cir. 1979).
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The argument that a corpse has no rights is further strengthened by
the illegality of actions involving interference with dead bodies, such as
treating a corpse in a way that one knows would outrage ordinary family
sensibilities,55 mutilation, 9 disturbance of burial site,6" and interference
with burial.6 Although a cause of action existed in each of these cases,
the claim belonged to the survivors of the deceased and not the deceased
himself.62 If the corpse were an entity capable of possessing rights, the
action would belong to him or his personal representative. 63
Given that the dead are not protected under the Constitution and
possess no rights, does it follow that the living can make no provisions
that will be honored upon death, or that society may do whatever it pleases
with the body of the deceased? The simple answer to both of these
questions is no. Law and public policy dictate that the stated wishes of the
deceased will be honored, and what can and cannot be done to a dead
body.
A DECEDENT'S ABILITY TO DISPOSE
OF HIS BODY AS HE WISHES
In centuries past, a person, other than a monarch, has had little to say
about what is done to his body after death.64 Until the twentieth century,
the church had primary jurisdiction over burials because they were
5
"See MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.10 (stating such an act is a misdemeanor); see also State
v. Glover, 479 N.E.2d 901 (1982) (upholding the state statutory provision, which proscribes the
abuse of a corpse based on an ascertainable standard of "reasonable community sensibility").
59See Palmquist v. Standard Ace. Ins. Co., 3 F. Supp. 358 (S.D. Cal. 1933) (holding a
surviving spouse may sue for damages against a person who unlawfully and without authority
mutilates or destroys a deceased's body); see also Hall v. England, 534 S.W.2d 456 (Ky. 1976)
(stating a valid cause of action for multilation or desecration of a body exists in Kentucky);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 868 (taking the view that one who intentionally, recklessly,
or negligently mutilates the body of a dead person is subject to liability to a member of the family
of the deceased who is entitled to disposition of the body).
6 See Bessemer Land & Improvement Co. v. Jenkins, 18 So. 565 (Ala. 1895) (holding there
is a cause of action for removing a body from its place of burial without proper authority, but that
$1700 in damages was excessive).
6 See Brown Funeral Homes & Ins. Co. v. Baughn, 148 So. 154 (Ala. 1933) (stating
improper embalming which resulted in disagreeable odors and forced burial sooner than intended
was actionable as interference with burial).
62See Whitehurst v. Wright, 592 F.2d 834, 834 n.9 (5th Cir. 1979).
63See id.
"See JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 265
(1990).
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regarded as a matter of "sentiment and superstition.""5  The rise of
secularism usurped the church's authority to dictate vhat is done to a dead
body, and relegated the decision to the courts," the legislature 7 and the
next-of-kin.6S It is the interaction of these three areas that presently
dictates when and how the wishes of the deceased will be honored with
respect to disposition of his body, and in general, what can and cannot be
done to a dead body.
The States' Police Power
Even though a corpse has no cognizable constitutional rights, a person
may express his dispositional desires before his death."' These wishes will
be honored or ignored subject to the laws of the state and the rights of the
surviving spouse or next-of-kin.70 Although the time of the monarch has
passed, this hierarchy exists because public health and public safety are
well established functions of the state's police power.71 The disposition
of the dead falls within the parameters of the state's police power because
of innate health and sanitation implications.' Generally, this power
granted to the states cannot override any delineated constitutional rights,
such as a right of privacy or any other seemingly applicable right to be
buried as one wishes, but because a corpse has no rights at all, the states
have the final word.73 In the interest of society, the matter of disposition
of the dead is so involved in the public interest, specifically, the public's
health, safety and welfare, that it is subject to control by law, instead of the
fickle desires, whim or caprice of individuals.74
6Sld.
"See id.
67See 22A AM. JuR. 2D Dead Bodies § 5 (1990).
"See id. at § 1.
69See id.
70See Sacred Heart ofJesus Polish Nat'l Catholic Church v. Soklov.ski, 199 NWV. 8 1 (Minn.
1924) (holding the last wish of the deceased is to be taken into consideration regarding burial).
7 1See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
72See Wyeth v. Thomas, 86 N.E. 925 (Mass. 1909) (stating the mere a3:ertion that the
subject relates, through a remote degree, to the public health does not render an enactment on the
subject valid, but the act must have a more direct relation as a means to an end and the end i itnelf
must be legitimate); Fraser v. Lee, 8 Ohio App. 235 (1917) (asserting the legtslature has the pav. er
to exercise complete control of the burials of the dead, as far as is necessary for the protection of
public health, public safety and the detection of crimes resulting in death "vathin the police pav. r),
7'See Whitehurst v. Wright, 592 F.2d 834, 840 (5th Cir. 1979).
74See In re Estate of Moyer, 577 P.2d 108 (Utah 1978); sec also S'ycth, 86 NE at 925
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There are a variety of ways in which the states exercise this control.
For example, the location of burial grounds is a matter subject to the state
police power and such power has been exercised extensively.75 Ordinarily,
the spouse or next-of-kin who has the "right of burial" may select any
burial site with due deference to the wishes of the deceased.7' As long as
the provisions of the state are met, a person may be buried in any tract of
land even if it has not previously been used for burial purposes. 7
7
However, if a person buries a body impermissibly close to inhabitants, or
in other legally unacceptable places, they may be held civilly liable.78
Some courts have even recognized that burial is not an absolute right, but
a privilege or license to be enjoyed, subject to municipal regulation and
control, which is legally revocable whenever the public necessity
requires."
Other instances of the state exercising its police power over dead
bodies for the public health, safety and welfare include: if a person dies by
violence or in suspicious circumstances, statutes in all states require an
autopsy regardless of the wishes of the decedent or the next-of-kin,80 and
if the surviving spouse or next-of-kin who has the duty of burial neglects
or refuses to do so, such actions may constitute a common law
misdemeanor.8 Similarly, any disposal of a body which is contrary to
"See 22A AM.JUR. 2D DeadBodies §10 (1990); 14 Am. Jur. 2d Cemeteries §§9-11 (1990).
76Samsel v. Diaz, 659 S.W.2d 143 (Tex. App. Corpus Christi 1983) (quoting TEX. REV. CIV.
STAT. ANN. art.912a-20 (West 1982) which states that the right to control disposition of the body
of a deceased person shall be vested in the surviving spouse); Fisher's Estate v. Fisher, 117 N.E.2d
855 (I11. App. Ct. 1954) (holding burial by the consent of those having the paramount right is
regarded in law as a final sepulcher which cannot be disturbed against the will of those who have
the right to object, generally the next-of-kin); Haney v. Stamper, 125 S.W.2d 761 (Ky. 1939)
(stating that the surviving spouse has a paramount right not only to custody of the dead body, but
also to determine the time, manner and place of burial); Pulsifier v. Douglas, 48 A. 118 (Me. 1901)
(specifying that it is the duty of the husband to provide a suitable place for burial of the body of
his deceased wife and that once the body is buried, it becomes part of the ground).
"See Seaton v. Commonwealth, 149 S.W. 871 (Ky. 1912) (holding that the father of a
deceased baby could select the place of his burial in his wood lot, rather than a public cemetery
or private burying ground).
7"See Tulley v. Pate, 372 F. Supp. 1064 (D. S.C. 1973).
7"See Kerlin v. Ramage, 76 So. 360 (Ala. 1917) (quoting Page v. Symonds, that "such right
of burial is not an absolute right of property but a privilege or license, to be enjoyed so long as the
place continues to be used as a burial ground, subject to municipal regulation and control and
legally revokable whenever the public necessity requires").
"See DUKEMINIER AND JOHANSON, supra note 64, at 266; see also 18 AM. JUR. 2D,
Coroners or Medical Examiners, §§ 7, 77, 79 (1990).
"See Baker v. State, 223 S.W.2d 809 (Ark. 1949) (holding that indecent treatment of a
corpse is an offense at common law).
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common decency is a common law offense.82 Finally, public health and
public policy preclude persons from engaging in sexual activities with the
dead.83
THE LAW OF WILLS
The law of wills also plays a pivotal role in the ability of a person to
dictate the disposition of his own body. A will is a written instrument
executed with the formalities required by state statutes, whereby a person
makes a disposition of his property (real and personal) to take effect after
his death. 4 This ability to dispose of one's property is steeped in colorful
English history.8 5 It is derived from the proximity of the next-of-kin to the
bedside of the deceased and their ability to become the immediate
occupants and possessors of the deceased's property. t'
This English common law has evolved throughout the centuries into
American statutory guidelines which allow a living person to devise or
bequeath his property by will to take effect only upon his death.
'
2See State v. Bradbury, 9 A.2d 657 (Me. 1939) (extolling that the first requirement of a
sound body of law is that it should correspond with actual feeling and demands of communities,
whetherright orwrong. Under common law which gives expression to people's changing custonmS
and sentiments, acts which are highly indecent and hence contra bonos mores, are crimes For
example, indecently burning a dead body in a furnace is a crime); State v Harzler, 433 P2d 231
(N.M. Ct. App. 1967) (court convicted accused of indecent treatment of a dead body based on the
facts that he handled and exposed a dead woman's body for 30 days with the intent to pre'ent
burial and to prevent discovery of the body).
83See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-73a (1994) (prohibiting physical sexual actt i'tie3vith
a dead body).
'See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1598 (6th ed. 1990).
'
51d. 2 NV. Balckstone, Commentaries *10-13. The right of inheritance, or decent to the
children and relations of the deceased, seems to have been allowed much earlier than the right of
devising by testament. It is probable that [the right of inheritance arose because] [a] man's
children or nearest relations were usually about him on his death-bed, and are the earliest v. itne:_zes
of his decease. Theybecome, therefore, generally the next immediate occupants [of thedceaed's
property], till at length, in process of time, this frequent usage ripened into general lav., While hi
property continued only for life, testaments were useless and unknown. and, vhen it became
inheritable, the inheritance was long indefeasible, and the children or heirs at law were incapable
of exclusion by will... so strict a rule of inheritance made heirs disobedient and heedetrong,
defrauded creditors of their just debts, and prevented many provident fathers from dividing or
charging their estates as the exigencies of their families required. This introduced pretty generally
the right of disposing of one's property, or a part of it by testanent; that is, by %,ntten or oral
instructions properly witnessedand authenticated, according to the pIcasure of the deceazd,v.hich
we, therefore, emphatically style his will. Id.
"See id.
SSee Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U.S. 556, 562 (1942).
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However, despite history and tradition that survived thejoumey across the
sea, the court in Irving Trust Company v. Day88 explicitly held that,
"[n]othing in the federal Constitution forbids the legislature of a state to
limit, condition or even abolish th[is] power of testamentary disposition
over property within its jurisdiction."89 Thus, wills are subject to state
statutory requirements which promote swift disposition, ensure validity
and provide that, when amenable, the wishes of the deceased be carried
out.90 In short, wills provide the vehicle for living persons to specify the
disposal of theirproperty to take effect upon their death.91
Traditionally, property is conceptualized as a bundle of rights which
includes "the rights to possess, to use, to exclude, to profit, and to
dispose. ' 92 The provision that wills are meant only to dispose of property
is instrumental to the question of whether or not it is legal to procure
sperm from a dead body. If one's body or part thereof, is considered
property then a person could legally will his body, or as in question here
his sperm, as he wished within the confines of the applicable state law. If
on the other hand, one's body or part thereof are not held to be one's
property, the law of wills would not provide a legal avenue of relief.
Thus, a discussion of whether your body is your property, and therefore
disposable by will, is paramount to deciding the legality of post-mortem
sperm procurement.
Traditionally, at common law there is no property right in a dead
body.93 The courts specifically recognize that there can be no property
88Id.
89Id.
"See Harkness v. Harkness, 205 Cal. App. 2d 510, 516 (Cal. Ct. App. 1962) (stating the
right of inheritance, as well as the right of testamentary disposition, is entirely within the control
of the state legislator and is subject only to the conditions prescribed by such body).
9'See id.
92Brothern v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477, 481 (6th Cir. 1991).
9'Spiegel v. Evergreen Cemetery Co., 186 A. 585 (N.J. 1936) (holding the right to bury the
dead and preserve the remains is a quasi-property right, the infringement of which is actionable);
Floyd v. Atlantic C.L.R. Co., 83 S.E. 12 (N.C. 1914) (stating at common law there can be no
property right in a human body, using the word "property" in the ordinary sense); Pettigrew v.
Pettigrew, 56 A. 878 (Pa. 1904) (stating, "It is commonly said, being repeated from the earlier
cases in England where the whole matter of burials was under the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical
courts, that there can be no property right in a corpse"); Osteen v. Southern R. Co., 86 SE. 30
(S.C. 1942) (holding that a ticket collector wrongfully charged a man for a full ticket for his
brother-in-law's corpse); see also Moore v. Regents ofthe Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990)
(rejecting movant's conversion cause of action that he had a property interest in his excised tissue.
"[The laws governing such things as human tissues, transplantable organs, blood, fetuses,
pituitary glands, corneal tissue, and dead bodies deal with human biological materials as objects
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right in a body in the commercial sense,94 and that a dead body cannot be
the subject of barter or sale.95 The laws relating to wills and the descent
of property were not intended to relate to the body of a deceased.'
Unlike chattels or property, the body of the deceased forms no part of the
property of one's estate in the usual sense.97 For example, an executor or
administrator cannot maintain an action on the theory of any property in
the decedent's body.98 A dead body may not be recovered in an action in
replevin based on the right of property in the corpse,q9 nor may a dead
body be subject to a lien for the price of goods furnished during life, or for
the value of the casket.100
Despite the common law that there can be no true property right in a
cadaver, courts have refused to allow the doctrine to estop anyone from
seeing to it that the body is properly buried and that its resting place is not
disturbed.'0' Thus, a quasi-property right in dead bodies has been
recognized for certain purposes.'0 2 It is unclear whether this quasi-
suigeneris, regulating their disposition to achieve policy goals rather than abandoning them to the
general law of personal property. It is these specialized statutes, not the law of conversion, to
which courts ordinarily should and do look for guidance on the disposition of human biolo-tca1
materials").
94See Finnely v. Atlantic Transport Co., 115 N.E. 715 (N.Y. 1917) (stating, "[tihat there is
no right of property in a dead body in the ordinary acceptation of the term is undoubtedly true
when limited to property right as understood in the commercial sense");Teasley v. Thompzon, 165
S.W. 2d 940 (Ark. 1942) (holding that a dead body is not "property" in the common commercal
sense of the term and is subject strictly to the laws of descent and distribution); sce also Sulh an
v. Catholic Cemeteries, Inc., 317 A.2d 430 (ILL. 1974) (a dead body is not classified as propzrty
in the true legal sense of the word).
9 See Finnely, 115 N.E. at 716.
6See hz re Estate of Moyer, 577 P. 2d 108, 108 (Utah 1978).
97See id.; see also O'Donnell v. Slack, 55 P. 906,907 (Cal. 1899) (stating the body of one
whose estate is in probate unquestionably forms no part of the property of that estate), Frhers
Estate v. Fisher, 117 N.E. 2d 855, 855 (111. Ct. App. 1954) (holding that a dead body forms no part
of his estate for administration by an executor); Fidelity Union Trust Co, v. Heller, Z4 A 2d 4S5
(N.J. Super. Ct. 1951) (stating not only is there no property right in a dead body, but the bo@y is
not part of the decedent's estate).
9 See Gould v. State, 42 N.Y.S.2d 357 (1943).
'9See 22A AM. JuR. 2D Dead Bodies § 161 (1990).l" See Gadbury v. Bleitz, 233 P. 299 (Wash. 1925).
ISee Southern Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Morgan, 105 So. 161 (Ala. Ct, App 1926), ccrt
denied 105 So. 168 (Ala. 1926) (stating that the nearest relation of a deed per:on may mintain
an action against a wrongdoer for unwarranted interference %, ith burial, the action being bazed in
tort); Teasley v. Thompson, 165 S.W.2d 940 (Ark. 1942) (holding nght of possesston of a deal
body for burial is a legal right coupled with certain duties which the courts v. ill protect, and an
unlawful interference with these rights is a basis for a suit for damages).
"'
2See 22A AM. JuR. 2D Dead Bodies § 3 (1990).
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property right classifies sperm as property and thus, a proper item to be
willed. In an effort to quiet the debate and keep pace with modem
technology, a few cases have specifically addressed the status of sperm
(ova) and pre-embryos as items of property, yet none have addressed
whether one can will that one's sperm be extracted posthumously. 103 Here
the law has the opportunity to be proactive and decide whether sperm is
property and thus may legally be disposed of by will. Such a decision
would resolve some of the ambiguity over the legality of procuring sperm
from the deceased.
The seminal case in this country addressing whether sperm is
property and thus, legally capable of being willed is Hecht v. Superior
Court of Los Angeles County.1°4 On October 30, 1991 William E. Kane
committed suicide at the age of forty-eight in a hotel room in Las Vegas
Nevada.105 Some time just prior to his demise, Kane deposited fifteen
vials of his sperm in an account at California Cryobank, Inc."0 6 Kane
signed a "Specimen Storage Agreement" detailing the provisions of
storage and the conditions for release of the vials. 7 The specimens were
to be released to the executor of Kane's estate. 03 In another provision
titled "Authorization to Release Specimens," Kane specifically authorized
release of the specimens to Deborah Hecht or her physician. 0 9
Additionally, little more than a month prior to his death, decedent Kane
executed a will naming Hecht as the executor of his estate and bequeathing
the stored sperm to her. "0 Deborah E. Hecht was Kane's live-in girlfriend
"See Hecht v. Superior Court of L.A. County, 16 Cal. App. 4th 836 (Ct. App. 1993); Davis
v. Davis 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
"See id.
'
5See id.
'°'See id.
'°"See id. at 840 (discussing the storage agreement. On September 24, 1991, he signed a
"Specimen Storage Agreement" with the sperm bank which provided in pertinent part that "In the
event of the death of the client [William E. Kane], the client instructs the Cryobank to: Continue
to store [the specimens] upon request of the executor of the estate [or] [r]elease the specimens to
the executor of the estate").
...See Hecht, 16 Cal. App. 4th at 840.
"'°See id. (A provision captioned "Authorization to Release Specimens" states, "I, William
Everett Kane... authorize the [sperm bank] to release my semen specimens (vials) to Deborah
Ellen Hecht. I am authorizing specimens to be released to recipient's physician Dr. Kathryn
Moyer." It is unclear whether the "Authorization to Release Specimens" applies to the release of
specimen only during Kane's lifetime or includes release after his death).
"'See id. (On September 27, 1991, decedent executed a will that was filed with the Los
Angeles County Superior Court and admitted to probate. The will named Hecht as executor of the
estate, and provided, "I bequeath all right, title, and interest that I may have in any specimens of
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for the five years prior to his death."' In addition to Hecht, Kane was
survived by two college-age children from his first marriage, William E.
Kane Jr. and Katherine E. Kane."' In his will, Kane acknowledged that
his adult children "are financially secure and therefore [left] them nothing
other than the land included in th[e].bequest, subject to the conditions as
set forth .,,i OnNovember 18, 1991, forreasons that are unclear, Robert
L. Green was appointed special administrator of the estate of William
Everett Kane." 4 On December 3, 1991, William Kane, Jr., and Katherine
Kane each filed separate will contests."'
The issue in Hecht was whether sperm is considered property and,
therefore, permissibly willable." 6 At a hearing on December 9, 1992, the
trial court ordered the cryopreserved sperm destroyed."' On January 4,
1993 the court entered an order authorizing and directing the administrator
"to destroy all decedent's sperm in the custody and control of California
Cryobank, Inc., and in connection therewith, to instruct California
Cryobank, Inc., to destroy all of the decedent's sperm in its custody and
control."11 s Finding this outcome unacceptable, Hecht appealed the
order.1 9 The appellate court, unconvinced by the trial court's reasoning
or lack thereof, stayed the execution of the order and reviewed the
decision.2
my sperm stored vAth any sperm bank or similar facility for storage to Deborah Ellen Hecht" A
portion of the will entitled "Statement of Wishes" provided, "[i]t being my intention that samples
of my sperm will be stored at a sperm bank for the use of Deborah Ellen Hecht, should she co
desire, it is my wish that, should [Hecht] become impregnated with my sperm, before or after my
death, she disregard the wishes expressed in Paragraph 3 above [pertaining to dr~pasition of
descendant's 'diplomas and framed mementos,'] to the extent that she wishes to pre:erve any or
all of my mementos and diplomas and the like for our future child or children").
"'See id.
"
2See id.
"
3Hecht, 16 Cal. App. at 840.
4See id. at 841.
"'See id.
"16See id.
'"See id. at n.3 (When Hecht's counsel asked for the legal basis of the ruling, the court
stated, "It really does not matter, does it? If I am right, I am right and if I am wrong, I am Vrong.
As you know, I am persuaded by the arguments in the moving papers. This is something that is
going to have to be decided by the appellate courts. Let's get a decision." Before ruling the court
also stated, "Obviously we are all agreed that we are forging new frontiers because science has run
ahead of common law. And we have got to have some sort of appellate decision telling us v.hat
rights are in these uncharted territories").
.. Hecht, 16 Cal. App. 4th at 844-45.
9 See id.
12OSee id.
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The appellate court held that the trial court abused its discretion and
misapplied Moore v. Regents of the University of California.2'
Furthermore, the court quotingDavis v. Davist2 2 held that the frozen sperm
vials, even if not governed by the general law of personal property,
occupied "an interim category that entitle[d] them to special respect
because of their potential for human life."'' 23 Based on this reasoning, the
court held that at the time of his death, the decedent had an interest in his
sperm which fell within the broad definition of property in the California
Probate Code and therefore was subject to probate. 24 Because there were
genuine issues of material fact as to the testamentary capacity of William
E. Kane at the time he executed his will, this ruling did not instantly
resolve the fate of the sperm. 25 However, the court held that:
[A]t the time of his death, decedent had an interest, in the nature of
ownership, to the extent that he had decision making authority as
to the use of his sperm for reproduction. Such interest is sufficient
to constitute 'property' within the meaning of Probate Code section
62. Accordingly, the probate court has jurisdiction with respect to
the vials of sperm.126
...Id. at 846; Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,793 P.2d 479, 479 (Cal. 1990) (In
Moore, Moore underwent treatment at the University of California at Los Angeles Medical Center
for a rare form of leukemia (hairy-cell). His physician realized his tissue had certain unique
properties that warranted research and could lead to a profitable patent. The physician removed
tissue and took blood samples beyond what was required for treatment. The physician never
informed Moore of the research nor received his consent, but was successful in deriving a cell line
from Moore's tissue. The physician and his colleagues received a patent. Moore sued for
conversion and failing to obtain informed consent. Moore's conversion action was dismissed for
failing to state a cause of action).
12Davis v. Davis 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
"~Hecht v. Superior Court of L.A. County, 16 Cal. App. 4th 836, 849-50 (Ct. App. 1993);
see also Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 956.
124See Hecht, 16 Cal. App. 4th at 850 (stating decedent had an interest in his sperm which
falls within the broad definition of property in probate code section 62, as "anything that may be
the subject of ownership and includes both real and personal property and any interest therein.");
see also Hecht 16 Cal. App. 4th at 845 ("All proceedings in the probate court are limited and
special or limited and statutory. The power of the probate court extends only to the property of
the decedent."); Estate of Lee, 124 Cal. App. 3d 687, 692 (Ct. App. 1981) ("The right of
inheritance, as well as the right of testamentary disposition, is entirely within the control of the
state Legislature and is subject only to the conditions proscribed by such body." Harkzness v.
Harkness, 205 Cal. App. 2d 510, 516 (1962)).
"2sSee Hecht, 16 Cal. App. 4th at 850.
126id
"
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Similarly, the Davis court held that frozen pre-embryos were "quasi-
property" because of their potential for human life.17 Disposition of these
pre-embryos, the court held, was a matter of decision for the parties
contributing the gametes.1
8
In a foreign case factually similar to Heclit, a French tribunal held
that a widow was entitled to withdraw from cryopreservation previously
deposited semen of her deceased husband. 9 However, the French
tribunaux of grande instance in Parapala v. CECOS"'3 did not glean its
decision from property law finding, "it is impossible to characterize
human sperm as movable, inheritable property within the contemplation
of the French legislative scheme," but rather held that "the fate of the
sperm must be decided by the person from whom it is drawn . . .
[t]herefore, the sole issue becomes that of intent."'3'
Alain Parpalaix, a French citizen, was twenty-four and dying from
testicular cancer. 132 Heeding warnings from his doctor that chemotherapy
would leave him sterile, he made one deposit of sperm at the Centre
d'Etude et de Conservation du Sperme (CECOS). 3 3 Like William Kane
and Deborah Hecht, at the time Parpalaix deposited his sperm he was
living with his girlfriend Corinne Richard. 134  Unlike Kane, Parpalaix
"
7Davisv. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992); see also Hall v. Fertilitynst. ofNew
Orleans, 647 So. 2d 1348 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that ifa formal written act ofdonation is
properly executed in accordance with the applicable governing laws, sperm could be the subjeat
of such a donation); York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989) (resolving a bailment
dispute over frozen pre-embryos by assuming, without deciding, that the dispute vias over
property); Del Zio v. Columbia Presbyterian Med. Ctr., No. 71- 3588 (S.D NY. 1978)
(memorandum decision in which a woman ;vas awarded S50,000 for emotional distress v.hen a
doctor deliberately destroyed the contents of the petri dish in which lay her egg and her husband's
sperm for in vitro fertilization).
'
2sSee Davis, 842 S.W. 2d at 604-05 (ifthe progenitors cannot agree on disposition, or their
preferences are not ascertainable, or if there is dispute, then their prior agreement concerning
disposition should rule. If no prior agreement exists then the relative interest of the parties in
using or not using the pre-embryos must be weighed. The party wishing to avoid procreation v, ill
prevail in most scenarios).
129See T.G.I. Creteil, Aug. 1, 1984, Gaz. Pal. [1984], 11.
130id.
13id. at 13.
'See id. at 11.
."See id. (The Center for the Study and Conservation ofSperm is a go. eminent sp,-rm bank
in the Paris suburb of Cremlin - Bicetre.)
4
'SeeT.G.I. Creteil, Aug. 1, 1984, Gaz. Pal. [1984], 11.
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married Richard two days before his death.135 When Corinne requested
Alain's sperm from CECOS, her request was denied. 136
Eventually, Corinne, joined by her in-laws, Alain's parents, sought
redress in the courts.137 After grappling with property and contract issues,
and various articles of the French Civil Code, the court dismissed the
notion that "human sperm [was] moveable, inheritable property" and held
that the sole issue was one of intent. 38 Based on the testimony of Alain's
wife and parents, the people in the best position to ascertain Alain's intent,
and Alain's actions of consciously depositing his sperm and marrying
Corinne, the court held in favor of Corinne. t3 9
These cases illuminate the intricacies of the law's challenge in
guiding fast changing reproductive technologies. These few cases are the
closest on point to addressing the issues conceptualized in post-mortem
sperm procurement and sadly, they provide almost no guidance. While
they may help by providing precedent for a woman to use her dead
husband's sperm to reproduce, or for a'man to posthumously father a
child, they provide no relief for the fundamental question of post-mortem
sperm procurement, can sperm be legally taken from a dead man?
It may seem apparent that women may use pre-mortem cryopreserved
sperm for post-mortem conception. t4 Such logic, however, puts the cart
before the horse. In the shadows of these enticing cases lurks the
undetermined issues of whether a man may make provisions in his will to
have his sperm procured or whether anyone else has the right to procure
a man's sperm once he is dead. Presently, a corpse has no constitutional
rights and sperm has not been held to be legally willable. Thus, a
decedent has no legal remedies to dictate disposition of his sperm. So, in
'
35See id.
13 6See id.
137See id.
3
'Id. at 13.
139SeeT.G.I. Creteil, Aug. 1, 1984, Gaz. Pal. [1984], 11; see also, Shapiro and Sonnenbliek,
supra note 28, at 30 (suggesting the very reason Alain married Corrine was to provide her access
to his sperm so that she could have his child).
4
'See Hecht v. Superior Court of L.A. County, 16 Cal. App. 4th 836, 836 (Ct. App 1993);
T.G.I. Creteil, Aug. 1, 1984, Gaz. Pal. [1984], 11; In re Judith C. Hart, No. 434-52-8512 (Dept.
of Health and Human Servs., Social Security Admin. March 27, 1995) (Nancy Hart gave birth to
Judith Hart 355 days after the death of her husband Edward Hart using his pre-mortem
cryopreserved sperm); Lisa M. Burkdall, Dead Man's Tale: Regulating the Right to Bequeath
Sperm in California, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 875, n.22 (1995) (describing a woman, Kim Casali, who
gave birth to a son using her deceased husband's pre-mortem cryopreserved sperm, and stating that
no one outwardly opposed the pregnancy except the Vatican which castigated her).
[Vol. 3:39
POST-MORTEM SPERM PROCUREMENT
an attempt to shed some light on the remaining question one must turn to
the rights of the surviving spouse and next-of-kin regarding the corpse of
their spouse or next-of-kin.
THE RIGHTS OF THE SURVIVING
SPOUSE OR NEXT-OF-KIN
Although there is no traditional property right in a corpse, courts have
recognized that a quasi-property right in dead bodies vests in the spouse
or next-of-kin.141 Additionally, there appears to be no question that the
spouse or next-of-kin of the decedent, rather than others such as the
executor or administrator of the decedent's estate, has the right to grant or
deny permission for an autopsy to be performed.14 2  The controlling
principle is that there exists a quasi-property right to possess, preserve and
bury, or otherwise dispose of a dead body by the surviving spouse or next-
of-idn.14 3 Paralleling this right, the spouse or next-of-kin has the right to
W'See Fuller v. Marx, 724 F.2d 717 (8th Cir. 1984) (stating any quasi-property right the
plaintiff had in her husband's organs, if protected by the Constitution, was also protected by the
Arkansas statute); O'Donnell v. Slack, 55 P. 906, 907 (Cal. 1899) (holding that the next-of-lan
does not in the full proprietary sense "own" the body ofthe deceased, they do have property rghta
in the body which will be protected); McCoy v. Georgia Baptist Hosp., 306 S.E.2d 746 (Ga. Ct
App. 1983) (announcing there is a"quasi-property right that exists in the dead body ofa relative");
Randomer Russ-Pol Unterstitzung Verein v. Posner, 4 A.2d 743 (Md, 1939) (holding that the
surviving husband or wife, or next-of-kin, has a quasi-property right in the dead body of the
relative in the absence of any testamentary disposition, this not being a property right in the
general meaning of the term, but existing for purpose of determining %%ho shall have cust-oy for
burial purposes); Doxtator v. Chicago & W.M.R. Co., 79 N.W. 922 (Mich. IS99) (holding that
although at common law there was no property right in a dead body, and wihile this still may be
deemed an accurate technical statement, there have been a number ofwell-considcrcd American
cases holding that there is some property right in a dead body for purposes of burial and the hkej;
see also, Barelav. Frank A. Hubble Co., 355 P.2d 133 (N.M. 1960); Parker v. Quinn-McGowven
Co., 138 S.E.2d 214 (N.C. 1964); Pettigrew v. Pettigrew, 56 A. 878 (Pa. 1904); Sullivan v.
Catholic Cemeteries, Inc., 317 A.2d 430 (RI. 1974); Terrill v. Harbin, 376 S.V.2d 945 (Te%. Civ.
App. Eastland 1964); Sanford v. Ware, 60 S.E.2d 10 (Va. 1950) (stating generally, that a quasi-
property right exists in a dead body in various jurisdictions).
142See In re Mgurdichian, 291 N.Y.S.2d 453 (App. Div. 1968) (holding that the cause of
action for an unauthorized autopsy is vested not in the executor, but in the spouse or next-of-in
who is charged by law with the duty of burial and who, by law, may authorize an autopsy); Leno
v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 302 N.E.2d 58 (111. 1973) (holding that the right of the next-of-kin to grant
or deny authority for a private or unoffical autopsy is as clear as the right of the state to perform
an official autopsy when a person dies under suspicious circumstances).
'See Steagall v. Doctors Hosp., Inc., 171 F.2d 352, 353 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
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consent to or deny organ procurement.'" Specifically, these rights belong
to the surviving spouse, if any, living in the normal relationship of
marriage, and if none exists, then to the next-of-kin in the order of their
relation to the decedent.145 This resultant quasi-property right arises out
of the spouse's or next-of-kin's duty to bury the dead, which authorizes
and requires them to take possession of the dead body for internment
purposes. 146 This right encompasses not only the right to possess the body
for burial, but the derivative rights to prevent the corpse from disturbance
after burial and to remove a body to a proper place of burial. 147 However,
this quasi-property right is limited to determining the custody of the body
for burial. 48 Once the body is properly interred, the custody of the body
ceases to vest in the spouse or next-of kin and escheats by law to the
state.
149
Although common law provides for a vested property right in the
spouse or next-of-kin to bury the deceased, some courts recognize a right
of a person to dispose of his own body in his will. 5 This is an unusual
outcome given that a body is not legally acknowledged property and that
the contraindicated purpose of wills are for the disposal of property. The
surviving spouse or next-of-kin is instrumental in exercising the wishes of
the decedent within the constraints of state law, but when conflict and
confusion present themselves, the courts provide the venue of resolution.
THE ROLE OF THE COURTS
The courts exercise a "benevolent discretion" when presiding over the
wishes ofthe deceased.' Should the decedent's wishes be reasonable and
'"See UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFTAcT, 8AU.L.A. 1-47 § 3 (Supp. 1989) (listing the order
of priority of the classes which can provide consent to organ procurement on behalf of the
decedent.)
14'See Steagall, 171 F.2d at 353.
'"See Nicholas v. Central Vt. Ry. Co., 109 A. 905 (Vt. 1919).
'
47See 22A AM. JUR. 2D Dead Bodies, §§ 21, 70, 82 (1990).
'"Sinai Temple v. Kaplan, 54 Cal. App. 3d 1103 (Ct. App. 1976).
'49See 22A AM. JUR. 2D Dead Bodies, § 70 (1990).
'
50See Holland v. Metalious, 198 A.2d 654 (N.H. 1964) (holding that in the ordinary case,
instructions be a decedent, by will or otherwise, with respect to disposition of his body, or funeral
services, or burial, should be respected and followed in preference to opposing wishes of his
survivors); In re Estate of Moyer, 577 P.2d 108 (Utah 1978) (stating a person has an interest in
his body and organs of such a nature that he should be able to make a disposition thereof which
should be recognized and held binding after his death).
'
5
'DUKEMMNIER AND JOHANSON, supra note 64.
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not in serious conflict with the desires of the living or in opposition to the
law or public policy, a person can feel reasonably comfortable that his
wishes will be executed upon his death."'
In Holland v. Metalious,153 Grace Metalious, author of the novel
Peyton Place, forbade funeral services in her will. " When the provision
was challenged by her family, the court upheld her wish as a reasonable
request. 155 Similarly, when Sandra Ilene West died having devised her
multimillion dollar estate to her brother-in-law on the condition that she
be buried in her 1964 baby-blue Ferrari dressed in a lace nightgown and
with the seat slanted comfortably, the court granted the brother-in-law's
petition that she be buried in the manner directed by herwill.-' However,
in In re Meksrus Estate,15 7 the court refused to enforce the wishes of the
deceased that she be interred with diamonds, jewelry and paintings
because it was against public policy and void.58 The court reasoned that
to grant the decedent's wishes "is almost certain to tempt some people and
invite others to overt action to procure the 'buried treasure. ' "9 The
aforementioned examples are not solely examples of the court's role in
resolving questionable wishes, but also illustrate their role in resolving
problems that arise when wills are not drafted in accord with statutory
guidelines or contain questionable dispositions.
Wills are a means by which a person devises of his property to take
effect upon his death. The court's role in this process of honoring the
wishes of a decedent with respect to wills is twofold. First, where a will
is suspect, the probate court provides a venue to resolve the dispute. Or
where a devisor has requested actions or devised objects beyond the
parameters of that which is statutorily permissible in wills, such as when
a devisor attempts to devise objects other than disposable property, the
court will often be the catalyst to resolve the conflict. Secondly, where a
person dies intestate, without a will, the courts may provide remedial
testamentary disposition, by applying the intestacy statutes. There are
many facets to the common law and statutory regulation of wills which are
"
52See infra, notes 153-59 and accompanying text.
'
53See Holland, 198 A.2d at 654.
54See id.
'
55See id.
'-
6See L.A. TIMIES, May 20, 1977 pt 1 at 3.
'7In re Meksrus Estate, 24 Pa. Fiduc. 249 (Orph. Ct. 1974).
'
5 See id.
1591d.
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beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that both the courts and
the legislature combine efforts to facilitate disposition of a decedent's
estate while honoring his wishes.
CAVEAT TO THE RULE: THE UNIFORM
ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT
While it is well established that there is no true property right in a corpse,
and that therefore, a corpse cannot be devised consistent with the law of
wills, public policy has carved an exception to this rule. Two factors
solidified this public policy exception. First, cadavers for scholarly study
and research have been and continue to be vital to the education of
medical students and the progress of medical knowledge.'" Second,
advances in medical technology have enabled physicians to successfully
transplant organs from the recently deceased to the gravely ill.'61 This
latter factor provided the impetus for the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act
(UAGA).' 62 Organ transplantation technology, coupled with the
fundamental principle of saving human lives, has, in recent decades,
defined the ever-pressing need for transplantable organs. 6 3 To fill this
need, UAGA was initially promulgated in 1968 to provide a statutory
framework whereby a person could legally devise all or part of his body
for specified purposes. 64 Such an instrument was intended to increase the
pool of organs for transplantation and the potential of saving human
lives. 165
UAGA has been adopted, either verbatim or in a modified form in
every state. 66 In pertinent part it provides that:
6
'See JESSICA MITFORD, THE AMERICAN WAY OF DEATH 85-89 (1978).
16 1See ARTHUR CAPLAN, IF I WERE A RICH MAN COULD I BUY A PANCREAS? 145-77
(1994).
1'6 See UNIFORm ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT, 8A U.L.A. 1-47 (Supp. 1989) (Prefatory Note)
(discussing the disarray of the laws pertaining to anatomical gifts prior to 1968 which are
described as a confusing mixture of old common law dating back to the 17th century and state
statutes that had been enacted from time to time).
" DUKEMINIERAND JOHANSON, supra note 64, at 266-67; see also Caplan supra note 161,
at 145-77.
'64See UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT, 8A U.L.A. 1-47 (Supp. 1989) (Prefatory Note).
16'See id.
16'See DUKEMINIER AND JOHNSON supra note 64, at 266-67; see also Caplan supra note
161, at 145-77.
[Vol. 3:39
POST-MORTEM SPERAf PROCUREMENT
(a) an individual who is at least [18] years of age may
(i) make an anatomical gift for any of the purposes states in
Section 6(a),
(ii) limit an anatomical gift to one or more of those purposes,
(iii) refuse to make an anatomical gift. 67
Section 6(a)
(a) (1) the following personsmaybecome donees of anatomical
gifts for the purposes states:
(2) a hospital, physician, surgeon, or procurement
organization for transplantation, therapy, medical or
dental education, research, or advancement of medical
or dental science;
(3) an accredited medical or dental school, college, or
university for education, research, advancement of
medical or dental science; or
(4) a designated individual for transplantation or therapy
needed by that individual. " (emphasis added)
Under the original UAGA of 1968, an anatomical gift could be made
by a duly executed will or by a donor card which was to be "signed by the
donor in the presence of two witnesses who must sign the document in his
presence.' 169 To facilitate organ donation, the revised UAGA of 1987
eliminated this witnessing requirement. All that is necessary under the
present version of UAGA is "a document of gift signed by the donor."""
Furthermore, the ability to devise one's organs by a duly executed will in
accord with the provisions of UAGA exists, even though such a provision
is unlikely to be fiuitful given the time demands of probate and the time
constraints of transplantation. 7'
In the absence of proper documentation or contraindication, and in
the interest of procuring organs to save lives, section 3 of UAGA provides
that:
'67UNIFoRM ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 2(a) (1987).
IISUNIFO1M ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 6(a) (19S7).
"69UNIFORM ANATOMCAL GiFT ACT § 4(a) (1968).
'
70UNIFORM ANATOMiICAL GIFT ACT § 2(b) (1987).
'
71See UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT AT § 2(e) (1987).
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(a) any member of the following classes of persons, in order of
the priority listed, may make an anatomical gift of all or part
of a decedent's body for authorized purposes:
(1) the spouse of the decedent;
(2) the adult son or daughter of the decedent;
(3) either parent of the decedent;
(4) an adult brother or sister of the decedent;
(5) a guardian of the person of the decedent at the time of
death.12 (emphasis added)
Here the promotion of public policy and the consistency in the law is
evidenced by the fact that common law establishes a quasi-property right
in the surviving spouse or next-of-kin to dictate burial of the deceased and
other associated proceedings, and UAGA vests power in the surviving
spouse or next-of-kin to consent to whole body or organ donation.
DOES THE UAGA RESOLVE THE LEGAL
CONUNDRUM CREATED BY POST-MORTEM
SPERM PROCUREMENT?
As sperm is human tissue, a more compelling case could be made for the
legality of post-mortem sperm procurement if UAGA, which governs
organ and tissue donation were specifically applicable. However, it is not.
UAGA clearly states that an "anatomical gift," which is defined as a
donation of all or part of a human body to take effect upon death or after
death, is limited to one or more of the stated purposes of section 6(a). '73
"All or part of a human body" theoretically at least includes sperm.
However, section 6(a) does not provide that an anatomical gift may be
used for conception. It does provide that such a gift may be made to a
designated individual for transplantation or therapy needed by that
individual.174 While an argument can be made for construing assisted
reproductive technologies employed to achieve conception as therapy, the
requirement that the individual need the procedure is a formidable
impediment to the applicability of UAGA to post-mortem sperm
procurement. A simple amendment to UAGA permitting anatomical gifts
'
72UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 3 (1987).
""UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT, 8A U.L.A. 1-47 (Supp. 1989).
'
74See UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 6(a) (1987).
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for use in conception might resolve the present conundrum, at least on the
legal level.
The key word is "might," because there is one final constraint at
common law that has yet to be mentioned regarding offenses against dead
bodies, that is, treating a corpse in a manner that would outrage and offend
reasonable community standards is illegal. 75 To limit any potential
offensiveness, a proposed amendment might decry the use of
posthumously procured sperm for all purposes except procreation. It
could explicitly ban procurement for experimentation or other practices to
deter the misuse of the procedure. Additional restrictions might also be
implemented based on "reasonable community standard" and the goals of
the policy.
IS IT LEGAL TO TAKE SPERM
FROM A DEAD MAN?
To determine whether it is legally permissible to take sperm from a dead
man to create a new life, we must first summarize the applicable laws
relating to dead bodies and determine if it is legally permissible to perform
post-mortem sperm procurement.
The aforementioned law pertaining to dead bodies can be
summarized, for purposes of applying it to the question at issue, as
follows. First, a corpse has no constitutional rights or cognizable interests.
Therefore, individuals have no absolute right to dispose of their bodies or
parts thereof by will or other means. However, the wishes and desires of
the deceased are to be honored by the surviving spouse or next-of-kin who
has dispositional authority so long as the wishes are not against the law or
public policy. The exception to this rule is that in the interest of saving
lives, UAGA permits a person to legally devise of all or part(s) of his
body, subject to the statutory provisions.7 6
It is the surviving spouse or next-of-kin who has a legally cognizable
quasi-property right in a dead body. This right encompasses the right to
bury or to cremate the deceased, to choose a specific place of burial, to
request and to consent to an autopsy and to consent to whole body or
7
'See e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.10.
'
76See UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT, SA U.L.A. 1-47 (Supp. 19S9).
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organ donation, provided that the deceased had made no provisional
indications to the contrary.
177
Balancing these permissible rights are some limitations imposed
under the guise of the state's police power in the interest of the public
health, safety, and welfare. Despite the rights vested in the surviving
spouse or next-of-kin and the state, no one may mutilate, desecrate or have
sex with a dead body, and the whole body or part thereof may not be
donated in the face of explicit disapproval by the deceased when alive. 1
78
Conspicuously absent from these laws and prohibitions is the answer
to the question, whether or not post-mortem sperm procurement is legally
permissible. It is only through extrapolation and analysis that a resolution
is reached.
Given the absence of rights possessed by the deceased, a shift' in
focus to the dispositional rights of the surviving spouse and next-of-kin is
necessary to resolve the post-mortem sperm procurement question.
Without doubt, there is a quasi-property right vested in the surviving
spouse or next-of-kin.'79 Given this premise, at the heart of the analysis
is the surviving spouse's or next-of-kin's right to consent to or to deny
permission to perform an autopsy or organ procurement procedure 80
However, before reaching the issue of consent, it must be determined
whether the procedures of autopsy, organ procurement and post-mortem
sperm procurement are medically indistinguishable.
Autopsies and organ procurement are medical procedures because
they are invasive operations that can only be performed by specially
trained, licensed physicians. 8' Similarly, post-mortem sperm procurement
may be performed in one of two ways: by a minimally invasive medical
procedure or by electroejaculation.'8 2 Both of these techniques also
require a specially trained licensed physician to perform the task.I183 Thus,
by this definition autopsies, organ procurement, and post-mortem sperm
procurement are medically indistinguishable.
177See supra notes 76, 142-49 and accompanying text.
178See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text; see also UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT
ACT, 8A U.L.A. 1-47 (Supp. 1989).
"
9See supra notes 141-49 and accompanying text.
"
8
°See UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT, 8A U.L.A. 1-47 (Supp. 1989).
.. 
1See generally UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT, 8A U.L.A. 1-47 (Supp. 1989).
2See supra notes 15-17.
'
83See supra notes 15-17.
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Acknowledging the similarities of the procedures, if the surviving
spouse or next-of-kin has the legal right to consent to or to deny
permission for autopsies and organ procurement, would not the same right
extend to consenting to or denying permission to perform post-mortem
sperm procurement? Arguably yes.
However, no right is absolute and all rights are subject to certain
constraints. The first constraint is that engaging in sexual contact with a
dead body, commonly referred to as necrophilia, is illegal." However,
necrophilia is defined as an obsession with and unusual erotic interest in
or stimulation by corpses. s While the former is clearly illegal, the latter
is a mental condition that, depending on its manifestation, may or may not
be illegal. Regardless of the semantics, it can be argued that the medical
procedure of post-mortem sperm procurement does not constitute an
illegal act. Support for this reasoning can be derived from the fact that
post-mortem sperm procurement is a medical procedure and not a sexual
act, and electroejaculation is also a medical procedure and not a sexual act
that is performed on living men, primarily those suffering from lower
body paralysis.186
A second constraint is the legal prohibition against rape and sexual
assault. Post-mortem sperm procurement, however, does not constitute
rape or sexual assault. Unlike necrophilia, rape and sexual assault require
a live victim because they mustbe accomplished with aperson against that
person's will.3 7 A dead body cannot consent to nor protest a rape, and
therefore cannot be in fear of imminent and unlawful bodily harm as is
required by law.lSS
A third consideration is that post-mortem sperm procurement would
constitute mutilation, but this is unlikely as well. Given that one
procedure, electroejaculation, requires no cutting into the body and the
other procedures require a minimal incision, in comparison to an autopsy
or an organ procurement operation, post-mortem sperm procurement
would not constitute mutilation. It is significantly less invasive than
" 'See e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-73a (1994).
'See WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (9th ed. 1988).
'See Pak H. Chung et al., Assisted Fertili
, 
UsingEtctrojaculation in Mcn 1-th Spinal
Cord bhjury-A Review of Literature, 64 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1 (1995).
'"'See MODEL PENAL CODE § 22.011.1 SSee id.
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presently approved and practiced medical procedures performed on
cadavers.
Similarly, post-mortem sperm procurement would not constitute
desecration because by definition desecration is the defacing, damaging,
polluting or otherwise physically mistreating [a corpse] in a way that the
actor knows will outrage the sensibilities of persons likely to observe or
discover his action. 189 Post-mortem sperm procurement does not entail
"defacing, damaging, polluting, or othervise physically mistreating [a
corpse]."'90 It is simply a minimally invasive medical procedure. It is
unlikely to outrage a physician who performs the procedure and who is
thereby the principle observer. Furthermore, it is unlikely to outrage the
surviving spouse or next-of-kin who requests the procedure. It would be
up to the courts to decide whether the procedure outraged the sensibilities
of other persons likely to discover that the procedure was performed.
Clearly, however, requiring confidentiality could prevent the latter from
having to be decided.
It appears then that post-mortem sperm procurement is a medical
procedure not unlike an autopsy or an organ procurement operation. It
appears that the surviving spouse or next-of-kin has the right to consent to
or deny consent for an autopsy or organ procurement procedure, and that
this right would extend to authority overpost-mortem sperm procurement.
It also appears that none of the potential constraints to restrict the
performance of post-mortem sperm procurement are valid. Therefore, if
legally challenged a right to perform post-mortem sperm procurement
would be recognized.
Having established the potential legality of taking sperm from a dead
man it is now appropriate to address the second question of the post-
mortem sperm procurement conundrum, what can be done with the
posthumously procured sperm and by whom?
'"'See MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.9.
19 0MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.10
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PROCREATIVE LIBERTY: AN ARGUMENT FOR
THE RIGHT TO AND NOT TO REPRODUCE
COITALLY AND NON-COITALLY
A corpse has no constitutional rights. Therefore, it is not necessary to
address the right to or not to procreate on behalf of the deceased man
whose sperm was procured, because no such rights exist. As a result, this
section will discuss procreative liberty - the right to and not to procreate -
vested in the surviving spouse or next-of-kin, and whether such rights
extend to non-coital reproduction with a dead man's sperm.
In 1965, Justice Douglas speaking for the Court toured the Bill of
Rights and established a constitutional right to use contraceptives." He
found this liberty grounded in a right of privacy which he derived from
analogous First Amendment cases.' 92 The decision was reached after a
physician and a married couple challenged a Connecticut statute which
prohibited the use and distribution of contraceptives.' Although the
married couple challenging the statue were not formally charged, the court
couched its opinion in terms of married couples. 114  Justice Douglas
queried, "[w]ould we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of
married bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives?"" He
then rhetorically responded, "[tihe very idea is repulsive to the notions of
privacy surrounding the marriage relationship. ' 'i
From contraception to abortion the Supreme Court has already clearly
established a well pronounced right not to procreate. 97 The burdens of
unwanted pregnancy and child rearing are deemed so substantial that any
competent person - married, single, adult, or minor - may use
.
91See Griswald v. Connecticut, 3S 1 U.S. 479(1965); Eisenstadtv. Baird,405 U.S. 43S,453
(1972).
'
92See Griswald, 381 U.S. at 479.
'
93See id.
94See id.
'
951d. at 485.
... Id. at 485-86.
197See Griswald, 381 U.S. at 485-86 (holding that there is a Constitutional nght to u:e and
dstribute contraceptives); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that there is a Constitutional
right to an abortion based on a trimester scheme, dictated by viability); Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (reaffirming Roe v Made by holding that a
woman, single or married, adult or minor, has a right to terminate a pregnancy up to the point of
viability).
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contraceptives to avoid pregnancy, and choose to abort until the time of
viability.' 98
Procreative liberty includes not only the right not to procreate but a
right to procreate; in essence, to do those things that will lead to biological
descendants.'99 The right to reproduce, if anything, is a right against
public or private interference.2"' It is not a positive right to the services or
resources needed to reproduce. 20' This right, while undeniably significant,
has never received explicit legal recognition. The absence of an
articulated doctrine is a result of the fact that the state has never attempted
to restrict married couples from having children when, and however, they
can.20 2 Thus, without a state actively restricting or regulating procreation,
a challenge cannot be brought to define the parameters of this presently
unarticulated amorphous right. Despite the legal absence of a recognized
right, several international declarations respect the right to reproduce as a
basic human right. For example, in 1978 the United Nations' Universal
Declaration of Human Rights stated, "men and women of full age...
[have the right] to marry and found a family. '2 3 Similar adages have been
expressed by the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights and
the European Convention on Human Rights.204  However, these
declarations have not been ratified by the United States, and therefore,
have no legal effect.20 '
"'See id; see also John A. Robertson, The Constitutional Aspects of Procreative Liberty,
62 FERTILITY & STERILITY 3S, 3S (1994).
199See Robertson, supra note 198 at 3S.2
°°See JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVYE
TECHNOLOGIES 29 (1994).201See id.2 2See Robertson, supra note 198, at 3S; see also Danridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970)(discussing that indirect restrictions on welfare benefits are not considered restrictions on
procreative choice); ROBERTSON, supra note 200, at 29-30.20Robertson, supra note 198, at 3S; ROBERTSON, supra note 200, at n.3 1.20
'See The International Convention of Civil and Political Rights, Art. 23 (1976); European
Convention on Human Rights Art. 12 (1953).2
°
5See Robertson, supra note 198, at 3S.
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A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
TO PROCREATE
Because there have been few attempts by government to limit reproduction
there is little explicit law concerning the right to reproduce2 Q' Yet on
several occasions, the Supreme Court has indicated strong support for a
married couple's right to reproduce,20 7 and lower court judges have often
referred to such a right in dicta.2 S Although these cases have not involved
state attempts to prevent married couples from reproducing, they do
suggest that if a court were confronted with a direct limitation on a
married couple's desire to reproduce by sexual intercourse the court would
explicitly recognize a right to procreate.20 9 From 1942 to the present a
series of cases have alluded to this unwritten right to procreate.210 The
broad language of these cases appears to indicate this right is applicable
to both coital and non-coital reproduction.
The strongest precedent is the 1942 case of Skinner v. Oklahoma.211
In this case the court struck down a mandatory sterilization law that
applied to thieves but not embezzlers. The Court resolved the issue on
equal protection grounds while stressing the importance of marriage and
procreation as among "the basic civil rights of man.2 13 The Court went
on to note that, "marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very
existence and survival of the race."214 Such statements suggest that laws
restricting coital reproduction would have to surpass strict constitutional
scrutiny by articulating a compelling state interest that could not be met
in any other manner.1 5
This sentiment has been supported in other Supreme Court decisions
as well. In Meyer v. Nebraska,21 6 the Court affirmed the right of parents
to permit their children to learn a foreign language stating that
constitutional liberty encompassed "the right of an individual to marry,
"'See ROBERTSON, supra note 200, at 35.
2
'TSee Robertson, supra note 198, at 3S.2CSee ROBERTSON, supra note 200, at 35.
...See Robertson, supra note 198, at 3S.
2
"See infra notes 212-39 and accompanying text.
2
'Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).212See id.2131d.2141d.
" See ROBERTSON, supra note 200, at 36.
2 NMeyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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establish a home and bring up children. '2 17 In Stanley v. Illinois,218 the
Court resolved questions surrounding an unmarried father's right to rear
his child in favor of the father stating, "the rights to conceive and raise
one's children have been deemed 'essential,' 'basic civil rights of man,'
and 'rights far more precious than property rights." 219 When a pregnant
teacher wished to continue teaching, the Court in Cleveland Board of
Education v. LaFleur220 supported her decision stating, "freedom of
personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the
liberties protected by the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. '221 John Robertson, a leading scholar from the University
of Texas, suggests the most "ringing endorsement" of the right to
procreate was the Eisenstadt v. Baird222 decision extending the right to
obtain contraceptives to unmarried persons.223 This ringing endorsement
echoed from Justice Brennan when he penned, "If the right of privacy
means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be
free of unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." '224
Recently, Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter inPlannedParenthood
of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey225 stated, "[o]ur law affords
constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage,
procreation, contraception, family relationships, childrearing and
education.... These matters, involving the most intimate and personal
choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal
dignity and autonomy are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment." (emphasis added).226
Such statements suggest that a married couple's right to reproduce
would be recognized by even conservative courts, since coital
reproduction has been traditionally recognized as one of the main
217 d. at 399.
2
'Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).2
'
91d. at 651.
22°Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1973).
22'id. at 63940.
2 2Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
22 ROBERTSON, supra note 200, at 36; Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
224Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
2Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
226Casey, 505 U.S. at 851; see ROBERTSON, supra note 200, at 37 and n.46.
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functions of marriage and family.22 ' The holdings' singular language hints
that this liberty interest might also apply to unwed persons.223
Although most of the Supreme Court dicta cited above pertains to
married couples, a strong argument can be made to parlay this right to
unmarried persons.229 Unmarried persons may have the same or similar
needs and desires to have and rear biological descendants as do married
persons.20 They may also be excellent child rearers and supportive
parents. To ban procreation by a single person by any means seems
inconsistent given that unmarried persons cannot be forced to use
contraception, abort, or relinquish an illegitimate child.'2'
Most recently in Davis v. Davis-2 the Tennessee Supreme Court
announced that, "whatever its ultimate constitutional boundaries, the right
of procreational autonomy is composed of two rights of equal
significance-- the right to procreate and the right to avoid procreation.' 3
The court attempted to balance the right of Mary Sue Davis who wanted
to use the cryopreserved pre-embryos of her and her then husband, Junior
Davis, to procreate or donate for others to use to procreate, with Junior
Davis' right to avoid any such procreation. The court acknowledged
that the scale tipped in favor of the woman's right to procreate quoting
Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth23S which said, "in as
much as it is the woman who physically bears the child and who is the
more directly and immediately affected by the pregnancy, as between the
two, the balance weighs in her favor.'2b Nonetheless, the case was
resolved in favor of Junior Davis' right not to procreate, in part, because
Mary Sue Davis wished to donate the pre-embryos to another couple as
opposed to having them implanted in her uterus.237 Despite this ultimate
outcome the court stated, "the case would be closer if Mary Sue Davis
were seeking to use the pre-embryos herself, but only if she could not
227See ROBERTSON, supra note 200, at 37 and n.46.
22nSee ROBERTSON, supra note 200, at 37 and n.46.
2"See Robertson, supra note 198, at 4S; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972);
Carey v. Population Services, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
2 0See Robertson, supra note 198, at 4S.
2'See Robertson, supra note 198, at 4S.
"Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992)
2"Id. at 601.
2'See id.
"Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
261d. at 71.
237See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992).
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achieve parenthood by any other means. 2 38 This statement is not only
strong evidence that if directly challenged the court would recognize a
right to procreate for married and unmarried women alike, but suggests
that under certain circumstances the right to procreate might outweigh the
right to avoid procreation.
Despite this dicta and seemingly rational argument, it remains unclear
how the Supreme Court would resolve a challenge to an unmarried
person's right to procreate. The right to procure contraceptives and
continue a pregnancy does not necessarily implicate a single person's right
to conceive in the first place.23 9 This is notable because all actions that
may lead to procreation are not protected by a constitutional right. For
example, the Court has never acknowledged a right to engage in
fornication, adultery, rape or incest even though such activity could lead
to procreation.24 ' The Court might be extremely reluctant to strike down
fornication laws on the ground that they interfere with non-marital
procreation, much less recognize the right to engage in adulterous,
polygamous, or incestuous sex. 41 Similarly, they certainly would not
strike down rape statutes as an infringement on procreative liberty.
2 42
However, the dicta in Davis and reality tells us that with more than 31
percent of births in 1993 occurring out of wedlock, the Court would be
hard pressed to effectuate laws prohibiting non-marital sex or penalizing
unmarried reproduction.243
Finally, the absence of a recognized constitutional right of single
persons to procreate does not make it unlawful or unethical for physicians
to treat pregnant women or to assist them in reproducing.244 Thus, it is
legally and ethically permissible for physicians to treat unmarried persons
in the absence of any state or federal laws to the contrary.245
In short, there is an unquestioned right to avoid procreation and
strong evidence that a right to procreate would be articulated if a court
were presented with a direct challenge. While it appears that this
281d.
'"See id.
24 See ROBERTSON, supra note 200, at 38.241See ROBERTSON, supra note 200, at 38.242See ROBERTSON, supra note 200, at 38.
143See ROBERTSON, supra note 200, at 38; Robert J. Samuelson, The Politics of Ignorance,
NEWSWEEK, Dec. 18, 1995, at 45.
2
"See Robertson, supra note 198, at 4S.245See Robertson, supra note 198, at 4S.
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procreative liberty may extend to both married and unmarried persons, it
also seems to pertain primarily to coital reproduction. This is evidenced
by the fact that many of the cases discussed herein were decided before the
advent of the "reproductive revolution" and none of these cases, with the
exception of Davis, alludes to the effects of third party participation.
Thus, it is necessary to determine if the right to reproduce extends to non-
coital reproduction to resolve the matter at issue.
NON-COITAL REPRODUCTION AS AN ASPECT
OF PROCREATIVE LIBERTY
Similar to legal status of the right to reproduce in general, the law has not
confronted the right of those needing assistance to reproduce. However,
the principles that underlie a constitutional right to reproduce would likely
apply to those needing assistance because a couple's or a person's interest
in reproducing is the same no matter how reproduction occurs.?
Coital reproduction is legally protected not for the coitus but forwhat
the coitus makes possible: it enables the couple to unite egg and sperm in
order to acquire the possibility of rearing a child of their own genes and
gestation.247 The desire to have a family, to beget, bear, and rear offspring,
is as strong in those needing assistance as in those who can reproduce
coitally.24' Because the same values and interests that underlie the right
to coitally reproduce exist for the coitally infertile, their actions to form a
family deserve respect.249 Furthermore, state action to restrict non-coital
reproduction should be held to the same standard as would state action to
restrict non-coital reproduction, i.e. strict scrutiny. The use of various
assisted reproductive technologies, such as artificial insemination or in
vitro fertilization (IVF), should be protected. If protection is granted,
a couple would have the right to create, store and have transferred to them
extracorporeal pre-embryos created by their sperm and egg. 2S Such
protection might also include the right to employ a third party donor or
2
.See Robertson, supra note 198, at 4S; ROBERTSON, supra note 200, at 39.
147See Robertson, supra note 198, at 4S; ROBERTSON, supra note 200, at 39.
24 See Robertson, supra note 198, at 4S; ROBERTSON, supra note 200, at 39.249See Robertson, supra note 198, at 4S; ROBERTSON, supra note 200, at 39.
"
3 0See Robertson, supra note 198, at 5S.
"See Robertson, supra note 198, at 5S.
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surrogate to provide the gameies or uterine function required for a couple
to exercise their right to reproduce.252
Not everyone agrees that a right to reproduce by definition
encompasses a right to assistance.253 Those who disagree argue that there
is no legal right to reproduce if one lacks the unassisted physical ability to
do so.2 54  However, John Robertson refutes this argument with an
illustrative analogy about blindness and the First Amendment right to read
books.
Surely a blind person has the same right to acquire information
from books that a sighted person has. The inability to read visually
would not bar the person from using Braille, recordings, or a
sighted reader to acquire the information contained in a book.
Because receipt of the book's information is protected by the First
Amendment, the means by which the information is received does
not itself determine the presence or absence of First Amendment
rights. Similarly, if rearing, begetting or parenting children is
protected as part of a personal privacy or liberty, those experiences
should be protected whether they are achieved coitally or non-
coitally2 5
Similarly, not everyone agrees with the inclusion in a right to procreate of
the use of a surrogate.256 Opponents point out that the courts have not
acknowledged a constitutional right to the enforcement of surrogacy
contracts. 7 They go on to argue that even if a right to procreate were
specifically announced, surrogacy would be distinguishable because ofthe
intricacy and impacts of gestation.
Surrogacy aside, non-coital reproduction should be equated to coital
reproduction as both are grounded in identical desires and values
associated with conceiving, bearing and raising a child." 9 These rights
should not be overridden by religious or moral objections to the separation
'52 See Robertson, supra note 198, at 5S.
253See ROBERTSON, supra note 200, at 39.
254See ROBERTSON, supra note 200, at 39.
255ROBERTSON, supra note 200, at 39.
2S6See Robertson, supra note 198, at 5S.
2'7See Robertson, supra note 198, at 5S.
'28See Robertson, supra note 198, at 5S.; see e.g., In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988),
259See ROBERTSON, supra note 200, at 39.
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of sex and reproduction.260 They should be constitutionally protected
subject to the burden of strict scrutiny. To defeat such rights the state
would have to announce a compelling state interest that non-coital
reproduction would violate if left unregulated. Applying the concept of
a constitutionally protected procreative liberty to reproduce both coitally
and non-coitally, it appears that using the sperm of a deceased man would
be protected under the constitutional umbrella.
CONCLUSION
The majority of this paper discussed whether it was legal to take sperm
from a cadaver.261 By applying the relevant law and extrapolating when
necessary, it was concluded that it was legally permissible for the
surviving spouse or next-of-kin to consent to and to have the sperm of a
deceased spouse or next-of-kin removed. Having established the legality
ofthe medical procedure, a section addressing procreative liberty outlining
the established right not to procreate and arguing for an inferred right to
procreate.262 This procreative liberty covered both coital and non-coital
reproduction as the latter was implicated in this issue. From the argument
presented it could be concluded that there are supportive evidence and
strong arguments for the right to procreate as one chooses, even with the
sperm of a deceased male. Thus, just one question remains: "even though
it may be legal to perform post-mortem sperm procurement for the
purpose of reproduction, should it be done?"
Presently this question remains an individual decision for physicians,
and spouses or next-of-kin to make. However, post-mortem sperm
procurement is aprime opportunity for the law to proactively influence the
burgeoning field of reproductive technology. By amending section 6(a)
ofUAGA to include removal oftissue (sperm) posthumously for purposes
of procreation, consistency and a basis for informed decision-making in
the era of the "reproductive revolution" would be fostered, which may
avoid potential litigation.
26OSee ROBERTSON, supra note 200, at 39.
261See infra pp. 48-70.
2f2See i!fra pp. 70-8.
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